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The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is in the
process of adopting standards for IP-layer encryption and
authentication (IPSEC). We describe how “probable plain-
text” can be used to aid in cryptanalytic attacks, and an-
alyze the protocol to show how much probable plaintext
is available. We also show how traffic analysis is a pow-
erful aid to the cryptanalyst. We conclude by outlining
some likely changes to the underlying protocols that may
strengthen them against these attacks.
1. Introduction
DES, the Data Encryption Standard [25], is a strong cipher;
however, its key length is too short to provide much secu-
rity against a well-financed attacker [14]. More recently,
designs have been published for machines that can exhaus-
tively search the key space in a short time for a compara-
tively modest investment [34].
Most such designs assume blocks of known plaintext,
though at least one [33] relies on statistical properties of the
underlying text. However, as will be shown, knowledge of
full blocks of plaintext is not needed. The encrypted headers
that are used in the forthcoming standards for IP-layer en-
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cryption and authentication (IPSEC) [3, 1, 2, 22, 21]  pro-
vide ample probable plaintext. This plaintext can also be
used to drive a DES-cracking engine.
A probable plaintext attack works by looking at cer-
tain bit positions for which a likely value can be predicted.
Rather than looking for an exact match, though, even for
those bit positions, the comparison engine counts the num-
ber of matches. Packets with more than a certain thresh-
hold value of matches are kicked out for further analysis
by a second-stage engine; this could involve more probable
plaintext, semantic consistency checks, even (ultimately)
human analysis.
It is not necessary for all matches to be within a single
ciphertext block. However, since the cost of a decryption
is roughly proportional to the number of decryption opera-
tions, it is desirable to find single blocks with a high amount
of probable plaintext.
Normally, trial decryptions will be preceded by an data
gathering phase. This phase uses traffic analysis, packet
length, auxiliary information determined by other means
including conventional intelligence activities, etc., to deter-
mine the likely probable plaintext patterns.
Section 2 describes our notation and the relevant proper-
ties of the encryption modes used. Section 3 describes the
architecture of IPSEC. A detailed analysis of the probable
plaintext, using one and two packets of ciphertext, is given
in Sections 4 and 5. Some of the attacks described depend
on the ability of the attacker to identify particular conver-
sations; how this can be done is sketched in Section 6. We
conclude with a discussion of possible defenses (Section 7)
and a set of recommendations (Section 9).
2. Properties of Encryption Modes
Our primary focus here is DES used in cipher block
chaining mode (CBC) [26]. For this form of attack, stream
ciphers are essentially equivalent to a CBC-mode block ci-

These RFCs are obsolete, but at press time have not yet been replaced
by newer versions.
pher where the initialization vector is known; this has some
minor implications for the single-packet attack.
The discussion below focuses on aspects of interest to
us. More detailed information on the properties of these
and other cipher modes can be found in [32].
2.1. Notation
We use 	
  to mean “ciphertext  results from
the encryption of plaintext  using key  . The correspond-
ing decryption is written 
  . The symbol 
denotes bitwise exclusive-OR.
If a number is written with a subscript, that subscript de-
notes the base; unsubscripted numbers are in base 10.
2.2. Cipher Block Chaining
CBC encryption [26] operates by encrypting the











To encrypt the first plaintext block, ﬃﬂ is set to the initializa-
tion vector (IV). IVs may be agreed upon in advance, trans-
mitted encrypted, or transmitted in the clear. Using non-
constant IVs is sometimes recommended, in order to dis-
guise common prefixes. In the draft under discussion here,
a constant IV, derived from the keying material, is used for
all packets, in either direction. The use of a replay counter
serves to disguise block prefixes.










To encrypt data that is not a multiple of the underlying
cipher' s block size, some sort of padding and length infor-
mation must be added. There are a number of different
techniques that may be used; none of the straight-forward
schemes add much to the security of the encryption.
If the IV is unknown, it is impossible to decrypt the first
block. In effect, a secret IV acts as a second key, but only
for processing the first block.
All subsequent blocks can be decrypted given knowledge
of the key and the preceding ciphertext (not plaintext) block.
That is, a substring !  #" ﬀ$ﬀ%ﬀ " '&)( is a valid CBC encryption
of ! *" ﬀ$ﬀ$ﬀ " &( , with the IV set to  

.
3. The IPSEC Encryption Protocols
The packet layout for the current draft specifica-











Figure 1. Format of ESP packets. The shaded
portion of the packet is encrypted using DES
in CBC mode.
Version HdrLen prec/TOS Packet Length
Packet ID DF
M
F - Fragment Offset
Time to Live Protocol Checksum
Source Address
Destination Address
Figure 2. Format of the IP header.
shown in Figure 1. The first 32 bits contain the SPI
(Security Parameter Identifier). The SPI serves as an index
to the key, the IV, etc. The granularity of an SPI is not
defined by the standard; it may be for a single conversation,
or it may cover all traffic between a pair of hosts. Since
the SPI is used to find the decryption key, it is transmitted
in the clear; the remainder of the packet is encrypted using
DES in CBC mode.
The replay counter is initialized from the keying material
when the security association is created. It is not allowed
to wrap around; a new key must be negotiated before +-,#.
packets are transmitted.
Encryption may be host-to-host, host-to-firewall, or
firewall-to-firewall. In the latter two cases, tunnel mode en-
cryption is used; the payload of the encryption is an entire
IP packet [29], including the real IP header (Figure 2). For
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Len - F SRPAU window
checksum urgent
Figure 3. Format of the TCP header.
source port dest port
length checksum
Figure 4. Format of the UDP header.
host-to-host encryption, tunnel mode may be used; more
likely, the encrypted data starts with the TCP [30] or UDP
[28] headers (Figures 3 and 4).
Because CBC encryption operates on 8-byte blocks,
short packets must be padded. Up to 255 bytes of ran-
dom padding may be used; however, the amount must bring
the total length to 6 bytes more than a multiple of 8. The
padding is followed by a single byte that tells how much
padding was used. This is followed by a payload type byte;
it identifies the header type of the encrypted data. If tunnel
mode is not used, this value is (conceptually) inserted into
the IP header when the ESP control data is deleted.
The last portion of the encrypted packet is the authen-
tication field. The authentication field is calculated using
the HMAC transform [4], and is based on a negotiated se-
cret key. Authentication is mandatory, to avoid some of the
attacks described in [7].
4. Single-Packet Attacks
In a single-packet attack, trial decryptions are done on
one packet at a time. The analysis differs depending on
whether or not tunnel mode is used. It may be known a
priori, because of the presence of firewall routers; if not,
the packet length may be useful in making a determina-
tion. Measurements have shown that 30-40% of all packets
are 40-byte TCP ACK packets [12, 23]. If random padding
lengths are not used; the size will show through directly; if
they are used, analysis of the distribution of lengths should
yield sufficient information.
Depending on whether the IV is known, we may or may
not be able to attack the first block. The current draft in-
dicates that the IV is not known, which is just as well; the
content of the block can sometimes be predicted with great
accuracy.
The first word is the replay counter. In early versions of
the specification, the replay counter was defined as starting
at one; if we could intercept packets from the beginning of
the association, we would know at least 30 bits, and pos-
sibly all 32. Even with a comparatively late interception,
we could probably assume that the high-order 20-24 bits
are zero, especially if security associations are short-lived.
(There is an interesting tradeoff here. Conventional cryp-
tographic wisdom calls for limiting the amount of plaintext
encrypted under any one key. But too stringent a limit in-
creases the predictability of the value of the replay counter.
As we shall see, there are other such tradeoffs as well.)
More recent versions of the specification derive the start-
ing value from the keying material. This blocks single-
packet attacks.
4.1. Probable Plaintext in the IP Header
Our analysis must now be done for each possible header.
If tunnel mode is used, the IP header is next. The first word
of it turns out to be very predictable. The version number is
always /
*0
; the header length is almost always 1
20
, and the
precedence/type-of-service field is generally 3)4
*0
. (Some
implementations will set one of the type-of-service bits; if
the likelihood of this bit being set cannot be determined by
traffic analysis, we lose at most one bit of predictability.)
We also know a lot about the packet length, simply by
seeing how long the encrypted packet is. If random padding
lengths are not used; we can calculate all but the low-order
few bits. If random lengths are used, we can rely on traffic
analysis to pick out the ACK packets, for which the IP length
will always be +65
*0
.
Under favorable circumstances, then, the first ciphertext
block of a tunnel mode packet contains about 60 bits of pre-
dictable plaintext. If the IV is known, this block would be a
prime target for a cryptanalysis device.
The next block is of less use to the attacker, yielding only
24-28 bits of probable plaintext. The packet ID and check-
sum are effectively random numbers. The fragment offset
and flag fields, though, are generally all 0; the protocol iden-
tifier is almost certainly either 7
20
for TCP or 3-3
*0
for UDP
(and traffic analysis will tell us which), and the time-to-live
field will depend only on the behavior of the sending host's
protocol stack and on its distance in hops from the encryp-
tor. These may be known, at least to within a small margin
of error; if so, we can estimate values for the high-order few
bits.
The remaining fields of the IP header are the source and
destination addresses. In host-to-firewall mode, one of the
cleartext IP addresses will match the encrypted copy, giving
us 32 bits; if tunneling is used even though we are in host-
3
to-host mode, we know all 64 bits.
The more likely use of tunnel mode is for firewall-to-
firewall encryption. How many of the address bits are pre-
dictable will depend entirely on the circumstances. If valid,
assigned Internet addresses are used behind the firewall, and
these are known to the attacker (perhaps from unencrypted
connections from inside hosts to other machines on the out-
side), 16-24 bits per address can be predicted. The use of
CIDR block addressing [16] makes this even more likely. It
would seem desirable, then, to use arbitrary addresses for
machines behind the firewall, and rely on application gate-
ways [11] or network address translators [15] to conceal this
data. A note of caution is indicated here, though; addresses
can leak in many ways, and it is hard to close all such chan-
nels.
4.2. Probable Plaintext in the TCP Header
Because the TCP and UDP headers can follow either the
replay counter or an IP header, we cannot analyze them in
terms of ciphertext blocks; the alignment will differ. Ac-
cordingly, we will speak in terms of fields or words.
The first word contains the source and destination port
numbers. In general, the client's port number is unpre-
dictable, and should be considered random; often, however,
the server's port number can be deduced from traffic char-
acteristics (Section 6). If the determination can be made, 16
bits of probable plaintext are available.
Sequence numbers are usually random. Under certain
circumstances, however, they are quite predictable [24, 6];
if the attacker can establish its own connection to the source
machine at roughly the same time as the first packet of the
intercepted connection, 28-32 bits of the sequence number
can be predicted. Initial sequence number randomization
[5] would be a strong defense here.
The acknowledgment field is the reflection of the other
party' s sequence number; as such, it shares the same con-
straints on predictability. At one crucial point, though—
the initial SYN packet sent by the client to open the
connection—the entire field is zero. If this packet can be
identified, 32 bits of known plaintext are available.
The next word, containing a length field, flags, and the
window size, is often completely predictable. The length is
almost always 1
20
, the SYN bit is set at the start of a conver-
sation but not otherwise, the FIN bit at the conclusion, the
ACK bit is always set except in the first packet, the RST bit
is rarely used in any conversation of interest, the URG bit is
seldom set, and the setting of the PSH bit can be determined
from a knowledge of the traffic pattern and of the imple-
mentation sending it. The window size is somewhat harder;
however, given that most conversations are unidirectional at
any given time, the sending side is usually advertising a full
window whose size is in general a characteristic of the par-
ticular stack. Even without that, most TCP implementations
use window sizes that are powers of two; an assumption that
the field will be all 0s will have an error in exactly one bit
position.
As with IP, the checksum field is unpredictable; the ur-
gent pointer, however, is almost always zero, and hence is
predictable.
Under reasonable assumptions—that traffic analysis will
supply the destination port, and that we can identify the first
packet of a conversation—the TCP header therefore has 88
bits of probable plaintext, with a small uncertainty about the
exact window size. Furthermore, a single ciphertext block
will contain either a !89+ " 8:+-( pair or a !8:+ " 3%79( pair of words.
4.3. Probable Plaintext in the UDP Header
The analysis of the UDP header is similar, though of
course simpler. Again, we can deduce the server's port
number by traffic analysis; the length field can be approx-
imated from the total packet length. A fair estimate would
be 28 bits of probable plaintext in the UDP header, which is
likely too short without a lot of traffic.
5. Two-Packet Attacks
We can obtain even more probable plaintext by analyz-
ing pairs of packets from the same conversation. Since each
packet will have a different replay counter, the first block
of ciphertext will always be different; this in turn will prop-
agate to all other blocks of ciphertext in the message. If
some field should be constant in two different packets, and
decrypts the same way each time, we have good reason to
believe that the key was correct for both packets.
A two-packet cryptanalysis device has one key genera-
tor, but two decryption engines that operate in parallel. The
output of the two engines is compared using the same prob-
able plaintext techniques discussed earlier. In other words,
we are using two decryption devices for each candidate key,
rather than one; thus, the cost of the machine will roughly
double for a given level of performance.
The benefits of two-packet attacks can be seen most eas-
ily for the source and destination addresses fields in the IP
header. As noted above, if tunnel mode is used for firewall-
to-firewall encryption, the attacker has little knowledge of
what those fields should be. But if two packets from the
same conversation are decrypted, the two fields will match
each other. Similarly, the TCP and UDP port numbers can
be compared this way.
Fields that change slowly can also be compared, though
not with as much precision, by taking advantage of the lim-
ited leftward propagation of carries when adding small val-
ues to a counter.
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Counter Theorem: If a value +9; is added to a uniformly
distributed random < -bit number = , the probability that
any of bits 4 through > of = are changed is 3?6+-@A  BC; ,
for >EDF<HGI . The formal proof, by induction on > , is left
as an exercise for the reader; informally, a bit is changed if
and only if all of the bits to its right are 1s, up through the
bit position where the increment takes place.
Consider the sequence number field. If a 512-byte packet
is sent—common for many implementations of TCP—the
sequence number of the following packet will be incre-
mented by 512, or +6J . By the counter theorem, there is
a probability of .97 that bits 0-17 of the sequence number
will be unchanged in the second packet. For that matter,
we also know that bits 23-31 will be completely unchanged
if exactly 512 bytes are sent, giving us 27 bits of plaintext
with high probability.
The acknowledgment field can be treated similarly; how-
ever, because multiple acknowledgments are often com-
pressed into a single reply, our bound on the number of
unchanged bits is somewhat looser.
If we see a rapid string of packets from one conversation,
the counter theorem can be also be applied to the IP packet
ID and to the replay counter. The ID field is always incre-
mented by one for each packet in a security association, and
the ID field is generally incremented for each packet sent to
any destination. If a group of packets is transmitted in a
burst, without other processes on the sending machine in-
tervening, we can assume that the packets in the burst will
receive consecutive numbers.
Finally, under the right conditions we can apply this the-
orem to the TCP client port number field. Many Web pages
contain embedded images; each of these is retrieved by a
separate TCP connection. Again, if these connections are
closely spaced in time, they will receive consecutive port
numbers.
Together, all of these heuristics boost the amount of
probable plaintext considerably. Under a two-packet attack,
the IP header, 160 bits long, has about 127 bits of probable
plaintext, and the TCP header has about 124 bits predictable
out of 160.
That there is considerable redundancy here is not sur-
prising. Indeed, the same observation was made, albeit in
a rather different context, in the design of PPP header com-
pression [18]. When predictable header fields are added to
the redundancy in the user's data, it becomes apparent that
exhaustive search cryptanalysis is quite feasible even with-
out known plaintext.
6. Traffic Analysis
Probable plaintext attacks are not carried out on a whim.
They require expensive, special-purpose hardware. An en-
emy who builds such a device will do other sorts of moni-
toring to prepare the attack.
One form of monitoring is traffic analysis. Under the
right conditions, traffic analysis can reveal a lot about a
conversation, and provide information that will aid in crypt-
analysis. This is most easily seen by looking at TCP.
The open sequence in TCP consists of three messages.
The first is a 40 or 44-byte message from the client to the
server, containing an IP header, a TCP header with the ACK
bit off and the SYN bit on, the acknowledgment field set to
0, and possibly a TCP option specifying a maximum seg-
ment size. (Some implementations will also send the RFC
1323 [9] options; these seem to be rare at present.)
The second message is similar, though the ACK bit is set
and the acknowledgment field is non-zero. The third mes-
sage is a simple 40-byte message with ACK on and SYN
off. It is generally followed in short order by a message
from one side containing a few dozen to a few hundred bytes
of data.
The sequence described above is easily recognizable, es-
pecially if there has been no other recent traffic between
the two hosts or firewalls. If per-connection keying is used,
recognition is even easier, of course.
Different protocols have their own characteristic traffic
patterns. For example, SMTP [31] has a series of short data-
bearing packet exchanges between the two sides, followed
by a longer message from the client, and another set of brief
exchanges. HTTP [8] exchanges consist of a few hundred
bytes sent in one direction, followed by at least several hun-
dred bytes in the other direction. Also, many real HTTP
exchanges consist of several such sessions opened in short
order. Further examples are left as an exercise.
Packet interarrival times can also be used. Some years
ago, a phenomenon known as “packet trains”—bursts of
packets from a single stream—was identified [19], though
that applies more to local traffic than to wide-area traffic.
Statistical studies have been done as well; see, for exam-
ple, [27, 10]. The latter paper showed the distribution of
packet sizes and interpacket arrival times for some different
protocols; the differences are striking.
Perhaps more importantly, [10] also shows a very low
probability of more than one conversation between any
given pair of hosts. Even the number of simultaneous con-
versations between pairs of networks is quite low. To be
sure, their data is pre-Web, but even Web page fetches typi-
cally represent related conversations.
We know of no published work on traffic analysis of In-
ternet conversations. It would be useful to attempt such
measurements, using existing packet header data to assess




To defend against probable plaintext attacks, one needs
to reduce the predictability of the header fields. In some
cases, this is easy; in other cases, it cannot be done without
changes to the underlying protocols.
The simplest change is to avoid exposure of the IV. As of
this writing, the IV is not sent in the clear; this is probably
wise. But if a key for one direction is recovered by a two-
packet attack, probable plaintext techniques can be used to
recover the IV; this in turn may provide probable plaintext
that can be used to attack the key used for the other direc-
tion.
Given this, it was wise to change definition of the replay
counter. Instead of starting it at zero, it now starts some
random value derived from the keying material. This adds
at most a single subtraction to input processing: the starting
value must be subtracted from the reply counter mod +6,K.
before checking for wraparound. Another big improvement
is to avoid use of host-to-host tunnel mode. For host-to-
firewall mode, where tunnel mode must be used, a random
value can be substituted for the encrypted copy of the ex-
posed IP address; the receiving machine should know from
the key negotiation that this is taking place, and substitute in
the proper value. (To avoid spoofing, though, it may be wise
to do authentication calculations on the correct address.)
Little can be done about the other fields in the IP header.
The protocol field will generally specify TCP or UDP, frag-
ment offsets will almost always be 0, etc. If desired, the
packet ID could be selected from a permutation table; this
would provide some defense against two-packet attacks on
the IP header.
The semantic properties of the TCP header are even more
difficult to hide. Minor changes are easy, such as send-
ing random values for the acknowledgment field in the ini-
tial SYN packet, or sending random values for the urgent
pointer at times when the URG bit is not set. But it is hard
to see how to hide, say, the constant value of the acknowl-
edgment field in packets carrying bulk data in one direction.
7.2. Compression
Compression is often touted as a cure for excess redun-
dancy [33]. An ordinary compression function is theoreti-
cally inadequate, though it may provide some benefits in the
short term.
The problem is that the decryption engine could easily
do a trial decompression as well, before looking for the
probable plaintext. For now, the extra logic circuits and
time required may make this attack infeasible in practice;
soon, though, advances in hardware design will negate the
defender' s advantage.
A more promising approach might be to use a keyed
compression function. For example, the compression dic-
tionary could be modified based on the keying material.
A different approach to compression might be to use
semantic knowledge, along the lines of PPP header com-
pression [18]. For example, it may be possible to send
abbreviated sequence and acknowledgment fields. If per-
connection keying is used, IP addresses and port numbers
are implicit in the security association and need not be sent.
The replay counter is more troublesome; more or less by
definition, it can' t be abbreviated, and hence remains vul-
nerable to a two-packet attack. Keeping the IV secret, and
using different IVs in different directions, should help.
7.3. Avoiding Traffic Analysis
The best defense against two-packet attacks (and against
some forms of one-packet attacks) is to deny the enemy in-
formation about which packets belong to which conversa-
tion. Unfortunately, per-connection keying—recommended
above as well as in [7]—is the easiest tipoff for the attacker.
Timing correlations are also useful clues. It is likely to be
hard to detect such things on the long-haul backbone nets,
but the use of link encryption may be appropriate on the
line from an individual organization to its ISP. Other forms
of multiple encryption help as well; for example, firewall-
to-firewall encryption can be seen as a complement to host-
to-host encryption. We face a cryptographic conundrum
here. On the one hand, encrypting data from many streams
at once helps defend against traffic analysis. On the other
hand, it is generally thought unwise to encrypt too much
data with one key, or to use the same key for data at differ-
ent sensitivity levels.
To some extent, packet sizes can be obscured by dummy
traffic, or by non-uniform (or even keyed) distributions of
the padding length. Both are unfriendly to the infrastruc-
ture; the Internet is congested enough as is, without being
asked to carry unproductive data. To be sure, the padding
length byte itself can be considered as probable plaintext,
but using different amounts of padding would not seem to
matter.
8. Related Work
Probable plaintext cryptanalysis is not new. Perhaps the
most noteworthy example is the successful Allied attack on
Enigma during World War II [13, 20, 17]. For example,
weather forecasts often began Wettervorhersage Deutsche
Bucht (“weather forecast German Bight”) [17, p. 53]. Sim-
ilarly, the cryptanalysts often used messages encrypted in
both Enigma and a simpler system; solving one provided
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a “crib” for the other. On occasion, they even resorted to
chosen plaintext attacks; new minefields were regularly re-
ported in several different cryptosystems [20, p. 144].
There were analogues to double-packet cryptanalysis as
well. The original keying practice called for two encryp-
tions of the message's initial rotor settings; while the crypt-
analysts did not know what these settings were, they did
know that the pairs had to match [13].
The use of traffic analysis as an aid to cryptanalysis is
described in [20, p. 98], among other places. One British
cryptanalyst noted that the use of the same “keys” (actually,
key families, in modern terminology) indicated a common
command structure, which in turn suggested common ad-
dressees.
9. Recommendations
We have shown here how easy it is to find probable plaintext
in the headers (Table 1). For sensitive material, countermea-
sures must be taken.
The simplest defense, of course, is to avoid use of weak
ciphers. There is little doubt that DES is inadequate against
a serious opponent. That security systems based on it
should be vulnerable is not surprising; what we have simply
analyzed exactly how to attack one instantiation.
There are a few spots where minor changes to TCP im-
plementations would help, such as using random values in
“don' t care” fields. But these are of lesser value; the main
points of vulnerability—the acknowledgment and sequence
number fields in most packets—cannot be disguised in this
fashion.
Measures to thwart traffic analysis are useful against
two-packet attacks. As noted, encryption at the firewall is a
useful adjunct to host-based encryption.
For the longer term, work on keyed or semantic compres-
sion should be undertaken. There is a need for an IPSEC
compression transform for use over modems; we recom-
mend that due attention be given to probable plaintext at-
tacks when designing it.
Table 1. Summary of probable plaintext under





*If tunnel mode is used, the IP header will have 32 or 64
more bits of probable plaintext.
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